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Abstract
We introduce a novel framework to model limited lookahead in congestion games.
Intuitively, the players enter the game sequentially and choose an optimal action un-
der the assumption that the k − 1 subsequent players play subgame-perfectly. Our
model naturally interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and
subgame-perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). We study the impact of
limited lookahead (parameterized by k) on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting
outcomes. As our results reveal, increased lookahead does not necessarily lead to better
outcomes; in fact, its effect crucially depends on the existence of ties and the type of
game under consideration.
More specifically, already for very simple network congestion games we show that
subgame-perfect outcomes (full lookahead) can be unstable, whereas greedy best-response
outcomes (no lookahead) are known to be stable. We show that this instability is due
to player indifferences (ties). If the game is generic (no ties exist) then all outcomes
are stable, independent of the lookahead k. In particular, this implies that the price of
anarchy of k-lookahead outcomes (for arbitrary k) equals the standard price of anarchy.
For special cases of cost-sharing games and consensus games we show that no looka-
head leads to stable outcomes. Again this can be resolved by removing ties, though for
cost-sharing games only full lookahead provides stable outcomes. We also identify a
class of generic cost-sharing games for which the inefficiency decreases as the lookahead
k increases.
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1 Introduction
o
d
b
ℓ s
m
Consider the following situation, where two players want to travel from
origin o to destination d in the (extension-parallel) graph on the right.
They can take the metro m, which takes 6 minutes, or they can take the
bike b and then walk either the long (but scenic) route ℓ, which takes 2
minutes, or the short route s, which takes 1 minute. There is only one
bike: if only one of them takes the bike it takes 3 minutes; otherwise,
someone has to sit on the backseat and it takes them 5 minutes. Both
players want to minimize their own travel time.
Suppose they announce their decisions sequentially. There are two
possible orders: either the red player 1 moves first or the blue player 2
moves first. We consider the sequential-move version of the game where
player 1 moves first. There are three possible subgames that player 2 may end up in, for
which the corresponding game trees are as follows:
bℓ
(7, 7)
bℓ
(5,6)
m
(7, 6)
bs
m
(6, 5)
bℓ
(6, 6)
m
(6,4)
bs
bs
(6, 7)
bℓ
(4, 6)
m
(6,6)
bs
A strategy for player 2 is a function S2 : {bℓ, bs,m} → {bℓ, bs,m} that tells us which
action player 2 plays given the action of player 1. Player 2 will always choose an action
that minimizes his travel time and may break ties arbitrarily when being indifferent. The
boldface arcs give a possible subgame-perfect strategy for player 2. If player 2 fixes this
strategy, then player 1 is strictly better off taking the bike and walking the long route (for
a travel time of 5 compared to a travel time of 6 for the other cases). That is, the only
subgame-perfect response for player 1 is bℓ. This shows (bℓ,m) is a subgame-perfect outcome.
However, this outcome is rather peculiar: Why would player 1 walk the long route if his goal
is to arrive as quickly as possible? In fact, the outcome (bℓ,m) is not stable, i.e., it does not
correspond to a Nash equilibrium.
Subgame-perfect outcomes are introduced as a natural model for farsightedness [17, 18],
or “full anticipation”, and have been studied for various types of congestion games [2, 3,
4, 17]. Another well-studied notion in this context are outcomes of greedy best-response
[7, 8, 12, 20], i.e., players enter the game one after another and give a best response to the
actions played already, thus playing with “no anticipation”. Fotakis et al. [7] proved that
greedy best-response leads to stable outcomes on all series-parallel graphs (which contain
extension-parallel graphs like the one above as a special case).
In fact, in the above example both (bs,m) and (bs, bs) are greedy best-response out-
comes and they are stable. The example thus illustrates that full lookahead may have a
negative effect on the stability of the outcomes. After a moment’s thought, we realize that
in the subgame-perfect outcome the indifference of player 2 is exploited (by breaking ties
accordingly) to force player 1 to play a suboptimal action. Immediate questions that arise
are: Does full lookahead guarantee stable outcomes if we adjust the travel times such that
the players are no longer indifferent (i.e., if we make the game generic)? What is the looka-
head that is required to guarantee stable outcomes? What about the inefficiency of these
outcomes? In this paper, we address such questions.
A well-studied playing technique for chess introduced by Shannon [19] is to expand the
game tree up to a fixed level, use an evaluation function to assign values to the leaves
and then perform backward induction to decide which move to make. Based on this idea,
we introduce k-lookahead outcomes as outcomes that arise when every player uses such a
strategy with k levels of backward induction. The motivation for our studies is based on
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the observation that such limited lookahead strategies are played in many scenarios. In fact,
there is also experimental evidence (see, e.g., [13]) that humans perform limited backward
induction rather than behaving subgame-perfectly or myopically (i.e., 1 < k < n).
In general, our notion of k-lookahead outcomes can be applied to any game that admits a
natural evaluation function for partial outcomes (details will be provided in the full version of
this paper). In this paper, we demonstrate the applicability of our novel notion by focussing
on congestion games. These games admit a natural evaluation function by assigning a partial
outcome its current cost, i.e., the cost it would have if the game would end at that point.
Our model. We introduce k-lookahead outcomes as a novel solution concept where players
enter the game sequentially (according to some arbitrary order) and anticipate the effect
of k − 1 subsequent decisions. In a k-lookahead outcome A = (A1, . . . , An), the ith player
with i ≥ 1 computes a subgame-perfect outcome in the subgame induced by (A1, . . . , Ai−1)
with min{k, n − i} players (according to the order) and chooses his corresponding action.
Our model interpolates between outcomes of greedy best-response (k = 1) and subgame-
perfect outcomes (k = n, the number of players). Our main goal is to understand the effect
that different degrees of anticipation have on the stability and inefficiency of the resulting
outcomes in congestion games.
We combine limited backward induction with the approach of Paes Leme et al. [17] who
proposed to study the inefficiency of subgame-perfect outcomes. Subgame-perfect outcomes
have several drawbacks as model for anticipating players, which are overcome (at least to
some extent) by considering k-lookahead outcomes instead:
1. Computational complexity. Computing a subgame-perfect outcome in a congestion
game is PSPACE-complete [17] and it is NP-hard already for 2-player symmetric
network congestion games with linear delay functions [3]. This adds to the general
discussion that if a subgame-perfect outcome cannot be computed efficiently, then its
credibility as a predicting means of actual outcomes is questionable. On the other
hand, computing a k-lookahead outcome for constant k can be done efficiently by
backward induction.
2. Limited information. Due to lack of information players might be forced to perform
limited backward induction. Note that in order to expand the full game tree, a player
needs to know his successors, the actions that these successors can choose and their
respective preferences. In practice, however, this information is often available only
for the first few successors.
3. Clairvoyant tie-breaking. Players may be unable to play subgame-perfectly, unless
some clairvoyant tie-breaking rule is implemented. To see this, consider the example
introduced above. Note that in the subgame induced by bℓ (as well as bs) player 2 is
indifferent between playing m and bs. Thus, player 1 has no way to play subgame-
perfectly with certainty: in order to do so he will need to correctly guess how player
2 is going to break ties. Such clairvoyant tie-breaking is not required for reaching a
k-lookahead outcome.
Our results. We study the efficiency and stability of k-lookahead outcomes. We call an
outcome stable if it is a Nash equilibrium. In order to assess the inefficiency of k-lookahead
outcomes, we introduce the k-Lookahead Price of Anarchy (k-LPoA) which generalizes both
the standard Price of Anarchy [10] and the Sequential Price of Anarchy [17] (see below for
formal definitions).
Quantifying the k-Lookahead Price of Anarchy is a challenging task in general. In fact,
even for the Sequential Price of Anarchy (i.e., for k = n) no general techniques are known in
the literature. In this paper, we mainly focus on characterizing when k-lookahead outcomes
correspond to stable outcomes. As a result, our findings enable us to characterize when
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the k-Lookahead Price of Anarchy coincides with the Price of Anarchy. We show that
this correspondence holds for congestion games that are structurally simple (i.e., symmetric
congestion games on extension-parallel graphs), called simple below. Further, a common
trend in our findings is that the stability of k-lookahead outcomes crucially depends on
whether players do not or do have to resolve ties (generic vs. non-generic games). Our main
findings in this paper are as follows:
1. We show that for generic simple congestion games the set of k-lookahead outcomes
coincides with the set of Nash equilibria for all levels of lookahead k. As a consequence,
we obtain that the k-LPoA coincides with the Price of Anarchy (independently of k),
showing that increased anticipation does not reduce the (worst-case) inefficiency. On
the other hand, we show that only full anticipation guarantees the first player the
smallest cost, so that anticipation might be beneficial after all. We also show that
the above equivalence does not extend beyond the class of simple congestion games.
(These results are presented in Section 3.)
2. For non-generic simple congestion games, subgame-perfect outcomes my be unstable
(as the introductory example shows) but we prove that they have optimal egalitarian
social cost. For the more general class of series-parallel graphs, we prove that the
congestion vectors of 1-lookahead outcomes coincide with those of global optima of
Rosenthal’s potential function. In particular, this implies that the 1-LPoA is bounded
by the Price of Stability. (See Section 3.)
3. We also study cost-sharing games and consensus games (see below for definitions).
For consensus games, subgame-perfect outcomes may be unstable. In contrast, if
players break their ties consistently all k-lookahead outcomes are optimal. Similarly,
for non-generic cost-sharing games we show that even in the symmetric singleton case
subgame-perfect outcomes may be unstable. For both symmetric and singleton games
this can be resolved by removing the ties. We also observe a threshold effect with
respect to the anticipation level. For generic symmetric cost-sharing games, we show
k-lookahead outcomes are stable but guaranteed to be optimal only for k = n. For
affine delay functions the k-LPoA is non-increasing (i.e., the efficiency improves with
the anticipation). For generic singleton cost-sharing games, k-lookahead outcomes are
only guaranteed to be stable for k = n. (These results can be found in Section 4.)
Related work. The idea of limited backward induction dates back to the 1950s [19] and
several researchers in artificial intelligence (see, e.g., [11]) investigated it in a game-theoretic
setting. Mirrokni et al. [16] introduce k-lookahead equilibria that incorporate various levels
of anticipation as well. Their motivation for introducing these equilibria is very similar to
ours, namely to provide an accurate model for actual game play. However, their 1-lookahead
equilibria correspond to Nash equilibria rather than greedy best-response outcomes and none
of the equilibria correspond to subgame-perfect outcomes. Moreover, lookahead equilibria
are not guaranteed to exist. For example, Bilo et al. [1] show that symmetric singleton
congestion games do not always admit 2-lookahead equilibria (for the “average-case model”).
Subgame-perfect outcomes are special cases of n-lookahead outcomes. Paes Leme et
al. [17] generalize the Price of Anarchy notion to subgame-perfect outcomes and show that
the Sequential Price of Anarchy can be much lower than the Price of Anarchy if the game
is generic. On the other hand, this does not necessarily hold if the game is non-generic (see,
e.g., [2, 3, 14]).
2 Lookahead outcomes
We formally define congestion games and introduce some standard notation. We then in-
troduce our notion of k-lookahead outcomes and the inefficiency measures studied in this
paper. Finally, we comment on the impact of ties and different player orders in these games.
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Congestion games. A congestion game is a tuple G = (N , R, (Ai)i∈N , (dr)r∈R) where
N = [n] is a finite set of players, R a finite set of resources, Ai ⊆ 2R the action set of player
i, and dr : N→ R≥0 a delay function for every resource r ∈ R.1 Unless stated otherwise, we
assume that dr is non-decreasing. We define O =
∏
i∈N Ai as the set of action profiles or
outcomes of the game. Given an outcome A ∈ O, the congestion vector x(A) = (x(A)r)r∈R
specifies the number of players picking each resource, i.e., x(A)r = |{i ∈ N : r ∈ Ai}|. The
cost function ci of player i ∈ N is given by ci(A) =
∑
r∈Ai
dr(x(A)r). We call a congestion
game symmetric if Ai = Aj = A for all i, j ∈ N .
We say that Ai is a best response to A−i if ci(Ai, A−i) ≤ ci(Bi, A−i) for all Bi ∈ Ai.2
An outcome A of a congestion game G is a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) if for all i ∈ N ,
Ai is a best response to A−i. We use NE(G) to denote the set of all Nash equilibria of G.
An order on the players is a bijection σ : N → [n]. We denote the sequential-move
version of a game G with respect to order σ by Gσ. The outcome on the equilibrium path
of a subgame-perfect equilibrium in Gσ is an action profile of G and we refer to it as the
subgame-perfect outcome (SPO). We use SPO(G) to refer to the set of all subgame-perfect
outcomes (with respect to any order of the players) of a game G.
k-lookahead outcomes. Let G = (N , R, (Ai)i∈N , (dr)r∈R) be a congestion game and
σ an order on the players. For k ∈ [n], define Gk(σ) = (N ′, R, (Ai)i∈N ′ , (dr)r∈R) as the
congestion game with N ′ = σ−1{1, . . . , k} which we obtain from G if only the k first players
(according to σ) play. LetGk := Gk(Id[n]), where Id[n] is the identity order (i.e., Id[n](i) = i).
For notational convenience, for k > n we set Gk(σ) := Gn(σ) = G. Further, if the order
σ is defined on a larger domain than the player set of G, we define Gk(σ) := Gk(τ) for
τ : N → [n] the unique bijection satisfying τ(i) < τ(j) iff σ(i) < σ(j) for all i, j ∈ N
Definition 1. Let G be an n-player congestion game and let k ∈ [n]. An action profile A is a
k-lookahead outcome of G if there exists an order σ on the players so that for each i ∈ N
we have that Ai equals the action Bi played by player i in some subgame-perfect outcome
B of (G′)k(σ) that corresponds to the order σ, where G′ is the subgame of G induced by
(Aj)σ(j)<σ(i) .
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We say a k-lookahead outcome corresponds to the order τ if τ can be used as the order σ
in the definition above. We also define a k-lookahead outcome for k > n as an n-lookahead
outcome. We use k-LO(G) to denote the set of all k-lookahead outcomes of a game G.
Assuming σ = Id[n] for ease of notation, A is a k-lookahead outcome (corresponding
to the identity) if and only if A1 is the action played by the first player in a subgame-
perfect outcome (corresponding to the identity) of Gk and A−1 is a k-lookahead outcome
(corresponding to the identity) in the game induced by (A1).
example 2. Let G be a congestion game with R = {r, s, t}, A1 = {r, s}, A2 = {s, t} and
A3 = {t}. Let the delay functions be given by dr(x) = 2x, ds(x) = 1.5x, dt(x) = 2x.
Suppose the players enter the game in the order 1, 2, 3 and all anticipate their own decision
and the next player (k = 2). Player 1 then computes the unique subgame-perfect outcome
depicted on the left in Figure 1. Hence he chooses the resource s. This brings player 2 in the
subgame whose game tree is depicted on the right in Figure 1. His unique subgame-perfect
choice is s. This shows that the only 2-lookahead outcome corresponding to the identity of
this game is (s, s, t).
Inefficiency of lookahead outcomes. We introduce the k-Lookahead Price of Anarchy
(k-LPoA) to study the efficiency of k-lookahead outcomes, which generalizes both the Price
1We use [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}, where n is a natural number.
2We use the standard notation A−i = (A1, . . . , Ai−1, Ai+1, . . . , An) and (Bi, A−i) =
(A1, . . . , Ai−1, Bi, Ai+1, . . . , An).
3Note that we would need to write (G′)min{k,n−σ(i)+1} instead of (G′)k without our assumption that
Gℓ = Gn for ℓ > n.
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Figure 1: Illustration of game trees for Example 2.
of Anarchy [10] and the Sequential Price of Anarchy [17]. We consider two social cost
functions in this paper: Given an outcome A, the utilitarian social cost is defined as SC(A) =∑
i∈N ci(A); the egalitarian social cost is given by WA = maxi∈N ci(A).
Given a game G, let A∗ refer to an outcome of minimum social cost. The k-Lookahead
Price of Anarchy (k-LPoA) of a congestion game G is
k-LPoA(G) = max
A∈k-LO(G)
∑
i∈N ci(A)∑
i∈N ci(A
∗)
. (1)
Here the k-LPoA is defined for the utilitarian social cost; it is defined analogously for the
egalitarian social cost. Recall that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Sequential Price
of Anarchy (SPoA) refer to the same ratio as in (1) but replacing “k-LO(G)” by “NE(G)”
and “SPO(G)”, respectively. The Price of Stability (PoS) refers to the same ratio, but
minimizing over the set of all Nash equilibria.
Curse of ties. When studying sequential-move versions of games, results can be quite
different depending on whether or not players have to resolve ties. We next introduce two
notions to avoid/resolve ties.
We first introduce the notion of a generic congestion game. Intuitively, this means that
every player has a unique preference among all available actions.
Definition 3. A congestion game G is generic if for all N ⊆ N , A,B ∈
∏
i∈N Ai and
j ∈ N , Aj 6= Bj implies cj(A) 6= cj(B).
Note that if G is generic then Gk(σ) is also generic for every order of the players σ and
k ∈ N and every induced subgame is generic as well. Hence if A is the unique subgame-
perfect outcome (say respect to the identity) of G, then the subgame G′ induced by (A1)
is again generic, so that (A2, . . . , An) must be the only subgame-perfect outcome (with
respect to the identity) of G′. With induction, it then follows that for generic games, there
is a unique n-lookahead outcome which is equal to the unique subgame-perfect outcome.
For non-generic games, each subgame-perfect outcome is an n-lookahead outcome, but the
reverse may be false.
To see this, consider a congestion game with R = {r, s, t}, A1 = {r, s} and A2 = {s, t}.
Let dr(xr) = 2xr, ds(xs) = 2xs and dt(xt) = 4. Then (s, t) is a subgame-perfect outcome,
correspondig to the SPE depicted to the left below, so player 1 may choose s in an n-
lookahead outcome.
(2, 2)
s
(2, 4)
t
r
(4, 4)
s
(2, 4)
t
s
(4)
s
(4)
t
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However, in the subgame induced by (s), whose game tree is depicted to the right, both
s and t are subgame-perfect (player 2 is indifferent), so player 2 may respond s, giving the
n-lookahead outcome (s, s). This is not a subgame-perfect outcome.
Rather than assuming that no ties exist, we can also restrict the definition of a subgame-
perfect outcome: A tie-breaking rule for player i is a total partial order ≻i on the action
set Ai. If player i adopts the tie-breaking rule ≻i, then Ai only is a best response to A−i
if ci(Ai, A−i) < ci(B,A−i) for all B ∈ Ai such that B ≻i A. In particular, ≻i ensures that
player i has a unique best response. As a result, there is a unique subgame-perfect outcome
for each tie-breaking rule and order of the players. For symmetric congestion games, we can
consider the special case of a common tie-breaking rule ≻ on A that all players adopt.
Effect of the player order. Whether all subgame-perfect outcomes are stable may de-
pend on the order of the players. For example, for consensus games all subgame-perfect
outcomes corresponding to a tree respecting order are stable (see Example 27). Whenever
we make a claim such as “all subgame-perfect outcomes are stable”, this should be read as
“subgame-perfect outcomes are stable for all orders”.
Theorem 4. If G is a symmetric congestion game and A a k-lookahead outcome with respect
to Id[n], then (Aσ(1), . . . , Aσ(n)) is a k-lookahead outcome with respect to σ for every order
σ.
Proof. Let A be a k-lookahead outcome with respect to Id[n]. Then A1 is the first action
of some SPO B with respect to the order Id[n] in G
k(Id). Let S be a subgame-perfect
equilibrium inducing the SPO B.
In the sequential move-version (Gk(σ))σ , the root node is a decision node for player
i = σ−1(1) and S1 is a valid strategy for player i (since the game is symmetric). Similarly,
S2, . . . , Sk are valid strategies for σ
−1(2), . . . , σ−1(k). In fact, the game tree of (Gk)Id is
the same as the game tree of (Gk(σ))σ up to a relabelling of the players. This means that
in both games we verify the same equations when determining whether S is a subgame-
perfect equilibrium. Hence S is a subgame-perfect equilibrium in (Gk(σ))σ as well. In the
corresponding subgame-perfect outcome of Gk(σ), player i = σ−1(1) plays B1 = A1 = Aσ(i).
Similar argumentation shows that in the subgame G′ induced by (A1), the action A2 is the
action of σ−1(2) in a subgame-perfect outcome of (G′)k(σ).
This theorem allows us to assume that the order is the identity when proving stability
for symmetric games. Moreover, any permutation of a k-lookahead outcome is again a
k-lookahead outcome, which is a useful fact that we exploit in the proofs below.
Due to lack of space, some of the proofs are omitted from the main text below and will be
provided in the full version of the paper.
3 Symmetric network congestion games
A single-commodity network is a directed multigraph Γ = (V,E) with two special vertices
o, d ∈ V such that each arc a ∈ E is on at least one directed o, d-path. In a symmetric
network congestion game (SNCG), the common set of actions A is given by the set of all
directed paths in a single-commodity network Γ = (V,R). A series-parallel graph (SP-graph)
either consists of (i) a single arc, or (ii) two series-parallel graphs in parallel or series. An
extension-parallel graph (EP-graph) either consists of (i) a single arc, (ii) two extension-
parallel graphs in parallel, or (iii) a single arc in series with an extension-parallel graph.
In our proofs we exploit the following equivalences:
Lemma 5 (Nested intersections property). The common action set A of each SNCG on an
EP-graph satisfies the following three equivalent properties:
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1. For all distinct A,B,C ∈ A either A ∩B ⊆ A ∩ C or A ∩B ⊇ A ∩C.
2. For all distinct A,B,C ∈ A, A ∩B 6⊂ C implies A ∩ C = B ∩ C = A ∩B ∩ C.
3. There is no bad configuration (see [9]), i.e., for all distinct A,B,C ∈ A, A∩(C \B) =
∅ or A ∩ (B \ C) = ∅.
The non-trivial part that an SNCG has no bad configuration if and only if its network
is extension-parallel is shown by Milchtaich [15].
Fotakis et al. [7] show that each 1-lookahead outcome is a Nash equilibrium for SNCG
on SP-graphs. We prove that the converse also holds for EP-graphs.
Theorem 6. For every SNCG on an EP-graph, the set of 1-lookahead outcomes coincides
with the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. It remains to show that each Nash equilibrium of G is a permutation of a 1-lookahead
outcome corresponding to the identity.
Consider an NE A with corresponding congestion vector x. Let S1 be the set of actions
costing the least for the first player, that is, those minimising
∑
r∈P dr(1). This corresponds
to the set of NE of the 1-player game. Assume towards contradiction no one plays an action
from S1. Let P ∈ S1. Since A is an NE, P has become more expensive as more players
joined in, so some Aj overlaps with it. Pick j with |P ∩ Aj | maximal. Then by the nested
intersection property, no Ak intersects with P \Aj . Hence xr = 0 for any r ∈ P \Aj (these
are not chosen). We find∑
r∈P\Aj
dr(xr + 1) =
∑
r∈P\Aj
dr(1) <
∑
r∈Aj\P
dr(1) ≤
∑
r∈Aj\P
dr(xr)
using that Aj 6∈ S1 and P ∈ S1. This contradicts the fact that A is an NE.
Let j be a player picking an action from S1, so that (Aj) forms a 1-lookahead outcome.
Define σ(j) = 1. Suppose we have defined σ so that A′ = (Aσ−1(1), . . . , Aσ−1(i)) forms a
1-lookahead outcome for some 1 ≤ i < n. The profile
A′′ = A \A′ = (Aj)j∈σ−1{i+1,...,n}
forms an NE in the game G′ induced by A′. Repeat the argument above for A′′ and G′ to
define σ−1(i + 1).
3.1 Stability and inefficiency of generic games
As shown in the introduction, SPOs are not guaranteed to be stable for SNCGs on EP-
graphs. However, stability is guaranteed if the game is generic.
Theorem 7. For every generic SNCG on an EP-graph, the set of subgame-perfect outcomes
coincides with the set of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Because the game is generic, there is a unique 1-lookahead outcome (up to permuta-
tion) and hence a unique NE: The game G1 is generic and thus there is a unique cheapest
first path B1. The game G
2 is generic and hence so is the subgame of G2 induced by (B1).
Thus there is a unique cheapest second path, and so on.
We prove the statement by induction on the number of players n. The claim is true
for n = 1. Suppose the claim holds for all generic SNCGs on EP-graphs with less than n
players and let G be an SNCG on an EP-graph with n players. Let A be an SPO and S the
corresponding SPE, corresponding to some order σ which we may assume to be the identity
by relabeling the players. Given an action P of player 1, S prescribes an SPE S′ in the
game induced by (P ). By our induction hypothesis (the subgame induced by (P ) has n− 1
players), the SPO corresponding to S′ is a permutation of a 1-lookahead outcome in this
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subgame. In particular, if B is the unique 1-lookahead outcome of the game G and player
1 plays Bi, then the resulting outcome according to S is a permutation of B.
Suppose towards contradiction that A1 6= Bi for all i. By induction A−1 is a NE in
the subgame induced by (A1) (by the same argument as before). Since A is not a Nash
equilibrium and all players except 1 are playing a best response, there is an action P so that
c1(P,A−1) < c1(A). If player 1 switches to P , then the other players are still playing a best
response by [6, Lemma 1]. So (P,A−1) is an NE, hence a permutation of B. This means
that P = Bi for some i (and A−1 some permutation of B−i), which yields a contradiction:
c1(Bi, B−i) = c1(P,A−1) < c1(A1, A−1) ≤ c1(Bi, B−i), where the last inequality follows
because A1 is subgame-perfect for player 1.
Theorem 8. For every SNCG on an EP-graph, each Nash equilibrium is a subgame-perfect
outcome.
Sketch. Call game G′ (with delay functions d′r) close to G if for all paths P 6= Q and
congestion vectors (xr) and (yr)∑
r∈P
dr(xr) <
∑
r∈Q
dr(xr) =⇒
∑
r∈P
d′r(xr) ≤
∑
r∈Q
d′r(xr).
Suppose G is given together with a Nash equilibrium A. If G′ is a generic game close to
G which also has A has Nash equilibrium, then by Theorem 7 this is the unique subgame-
perfect outcome of G′. The close condition above (invented by Milchtaich [14]) exactly
ensures A is then also a subgame-perfect outcome in G. It remains to find a close generic
game, which can be done by adjusting the delay functions of G; each path contains a resource
he shares with no other path [15], so we can increase the cost of individual paths without
effecting the other path costs.
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 9. Let G be a generic SNCG on an EP-graph. Then for every k the set of k-
lookahead outcomes coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. As a consequence, k-LPoA(G) =
PoA(G).
Proof. Since there is a unique Nash equilibrium and k-lookahead outcome up to permutation,
it suffices to show that each k-lookahead outcome is a Nash equilibrium. By relabelling the
players, we can assume that the order of the players is the identity. Let B denote the unique
1-lookahead outcome of G corresponding to the identity. Then Gk has unique 1-lookahead
outcome (B1, . . . , Bk).
Let A be a k-lookahead outcome. Since each SPO of Gk is a permutation of a 1-lookahead
outcome, we know that A1 ∈ {B1, . . . , Bk}. This implies that the subgame of Gk+1 induced
by (A1) has some permutation of (B1, . . . , Bk+1) \ (A1) as unique 1-lookahead outcome
(where we perform the set operations seeing the tuple as a multiset). This means that
A2 ∈ (B1, . . . , Bk+1) \ (A1). Continuing this way, we see that Ai ∈ (B1, . . . , Bk+i−1) \
(A1, . . . , Ai−1) for i = 1, . . . , n− k and for i > n− k we find Ai ∈ B \ (A1, . . . , Ai−1). Hence
A will be a permutation of B.
The result of Theorem 9 does not extend to series-parallel graphs.
Proposition 10. For any SP-graph Γ that is not EP, there is a generic SNCG G on Γ such
that the sets of 1-lookahead and n-lookahead outcomes are disjoint.
Proof. Consider the single-commodity network with four arcs r, s, t, u and od-paths rt, st,
ru and su. Each series-parallel graph that is not extension-parallel has this network as a
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minor (see [15]). Thus it suffices to give a counterexample on this network. Consider the
generic three-player game with delay functions
(dr(1), dr(2), dr(3)) = (1, 3, 100)
(ds(1), ds(2), ds(3)) = (2, 4, 200)
(dt(1), dt(2), dt(3)) = (1.1, 4.1, 100.1)
(du(1), du(2), du(3)) = (2.2, 3.2, 100.2).
The unique 1-lookahead outcome (up to permutation) is (rt, su, ru) and the unique n-
lookahead outcome (up to permutation) is (st, ru, ru).
We next show that anticipation may still be beneficial for the first player.
Theorem 11. Let G be a generic SNCG on an EP-graph. Let B be a subgame-perfect
outcome with respect to the identity. Then c1(B) ≤ · · · ≤ cn(B). In particular, c1(B) ≤
c1(A) for any k-lookahead outcome A with respect to the identity.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) be a permutation of the unique NE of G for which c1(A) ≤
· · · ≤ cn(A). Let B be the unique subgame-perfect outcome with respect to the identity;
then this is some permutation of A by Theorem 9.
If player 1 plays A1, then his successors will play A2, . . . , An (not necessarily in that
order), so that c1(B) ≤ c1(A). Since B is some permutation of A and since A1 (which
may equal Ai for some i) is the unique element from A with the lowest cost in the profile
A, we find A1 = B1 and c1(A) = c1(B). Similarly, player j can ensure himself the cost
cj(A) in the subgame induced by (A1, . . . , Aj−1) and therefore cj(B) = cj(A). This proves
c1(B) = c1(A) ≤ · · · ≤ cn(A) = cn(B)
Finally, note that if C is a k-lookahead outcome, then C is some permutation of A and
therefore c1(C) = cj(A) = cj(B) ≥ c1(B) for some j ∈ N .
The following example shows that the cost of the first players does not decrease mono-
tonically with his lookahead. In fact, a generalization of this example shows that only full
lookahead guarantees the smallest cost for player 1.
example 12. Consider the generic symmetric singleton congestion game with R = {r, s},
dr(x) = x and ds(x) = x + 0.5. The subgame-perfect outcome with respect to the identity
is (r, r, . . . r, s, . . . , s) if n is even and (s, s, . . . , s, r, . . . , r) if n is odd. Thus, if A is a (n− 2)-
lookahead outcome and B a (n − 1)-lookahead outcome, then c1(A) = mini∈N ci(A) <
maxi∈N ci(A) = c1(B).
In contrast to the above, the first player is not guaranteed to achieve minimum cost with
full lookahead if the game is non-generic.
example 13. Suppose a symmetric singleton congestion game with delay functions dr(x) =
x = ds(x) is played by an odd number of players. The successors of player 1 can decide
which resource becomes the most expensive one and enforce that this is the one that player
1 picks, so that player 1 is always worse off.
3.2 Inefficiency of non-generic games
Let G be an SNCG and let A be an outcome. Let (xr)r∈R be the corresponding congestion
vector. We define the opportunity cost of A in G as the minimal cost that a new player
entering the game would have to pay, i.e., OA(G) = minP∈A
∑
r∈P dr(xr+1); this definition
is implicit in [8, 20]. The worst cost of A in G is the egalitarian social cost, i.e., WA(G) =
maxi∈N
∑
r∈Ai
dr(xr).
Lemma 14. Let G be an SNCG on a SP-graph Γ with m players and let Gn be the same
game with n ≤ m players. For any action profile A in Gn and any 1-lookahead outcome B
of G, we have OA(G
n) ≤ OB(G). Further, if n < m, then OA(G
n) ≤WB(G).
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The lemma above can be proved by induction on the graph structure.
Corollary 15. For SNCGs on SP-graphs, all 1-lookahead outcomes have the same value for
the potential function.
Proof. Let A = (A1, . . . , An) and B = (B1, . . . , Bn) be 1-lookahead outcomes (with respect
to the identity). If n = 1, then since both are chosen greedily we must have Φ(A) = Φ(B).
For n > 1, the profiles A′ = (A1, . . . , An−1) and B
′ = (B1, . . . , Bn−1) are also 1-lookahead
outcomes, so that by an inductional argument and using that 1-lookahead outcomes have
the same opportunity costs (Lemma 14), we find
Φ(A) = cn(A) + Φ(A
′) = OA′ +Φ(A
′) = OB′ +Φ(B
′) = Φ(B).
Applying induction on the graph structure again, we are able to derive that each 1-
lookahead outcome is a global optimum of Rosenthal’s potential function.
Proposition 16. Let G be an SNCG on a series-parallel graph. Let M denote the set of
global minima of the Rosenthal potential function Φ(A) =
∑
r∈R
∑x(A)r
i=1 dr(i).
1. For any A ∈M, there is a 1-lookahead outcome B with x(B) = x(A).
2. All 1-lookahead outcomes of G are global minima of the potential function and
{x(B) | B 1-lookahead outcome} = {x(A) | A ∈M}.
Fotakis [6, Lemma 3] proves the following proposition:
Proposition 17 (Lemma 3 in [6]). Let G be an SNCG on an SP-graph with delay functions
in class D. For any global minimum A of the Rosenthal potential function and any other
profile B we have
∑
i∈N ci(A) ≤ ρ(D)
∑
i∈N ci(B), where
ρ(D) =
(
1− sup
d∈D\{0}
sup
x,y≥0
y(d(x)− d(y))
xd(x)
)−1
.
For example, if D consists of all affine functions then ρ(D) = 43 . Fotakis [6] also proves
that for SNCGs on SP-graphs, the Price of Stability is ρ(D). Combining all these results,
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 18. For every SNCG on an SP-graph with delay functions in class D, we have
1-LPoA ≤ ρ(D) = PoS.
Note that 1-lookahead outcomes are only guaranteed to be optimal Nash equilibria for
games with the worst Price of Stability; a procedure for finding an optimal Nash equilibrium
for every SNCG on a SP-graph is an NP-hard problem [20].
For series-parallel graphs, 1-lookahead outcomes have maximal worst cost among the
Nash equilibria [8]; we useW (G) to refer to the common worst cost of 1-lookahead outcomes.
Lemma 19. Let G be an SNCG on an SP-graph with n players and common action set A.
Let P1, . . . , Pm ∈ A for m < n and let G′ be the subgame of G induced by (P1, . . . , Pm).
Then W (G′) ≤W (G).
Proof. The subgame G′ is again an SNCG (with n−m players). By Lemma 1 in [8], the last
player pays the worst cost in any 1-lookahead outcome B of G′. Moreover, the last player
pays at most W (G): by Lemma 14, the profile A′ = (P1, . . . , Pm, B1, . . . , Bn−m−1) satisfies
OA′(G
n−1) ≤W (G) where Gn−1 denotes the game G with n− 1 players. Hence the greedy
choice will cost at most W (G).
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In particular, when at most n−1 players have chosen a path, there is still a path available
of cost at mostW (G). On EP-graphs, Nash equilibria (and thus also 1-lookahead outcomes)
have optimal egalitarian social cost [5].
Theorem 20. For every SNCG G on an EP-graph, each SPO A has optimal egalitarian
social cost, i.e., WA =W (G).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the number of players in the game. If G has n = 1
players then the claim is true. Assume the claim is true for all subgame-perfect outcomes A
in games G with at most k players for some k ≥ 1. Suppose towards contradiction that there
is a game G with n = k+ 1 players for which there exists an SPO A with WA(G) > W (G).
Renumber the players so that A corresponds to the identity. Let j be the last player
paying a cost worse than W (G) in the profile A. If j 6= 1, then the subgame G′ induced
by (A1, . . . , Aj−1) has at most k players so that by induction the SPO A
′ = (Aj , . . . , An)
satisfies W (G′) = WA′(G
′) > W (G) (the strict inequality follows by the choice of j). This
is a contradiction with Lemma 19. Hence we assume j = 1.
Let P minimize
∑
r∈P dr(1), i.e., choose the cheapest path at the start of the game.
Consider the subgame G′ induced by (P ). Take a subgame-perfect outcome B = (Bi)i>1
for this subgame. Let x be the congestion vector corresponding to (P,B2, . . . , Bn).
1. Since player 1’s subgame-perfect move costs more than W (G), path P will eventually
cost c(P, x) :=
∑
r∈P dr(xr) > W (G).
2. Since B is an SPO in G′ and G′ has strictly less players than G, we get WB(G
′) =
W (G′) by induction. Hence c(Bi, x) ≤WB(G′) =W (G′) ≤W (G) for all i > 1, where
the last inequality follows from Lemma 19.
By 1. and 2., no successor of player 1 can pick P . By 1., there must be a player picking
a path having overlap with P . Let i > 1 for which |P ∩ Bi| is largest. By the nested
intersection property, no player k > 1 picks a path overlapping with P \Bi. It follows that
c(Bi, x) ≥
∑
r∈Bi∩P
dr(xr) +
∑
r∈Bi\P
dr(1)
≥
∑
r∈Bi∩P
dr(xr) +
∑
r∈P\Bi
dr(1) = c(P, x),
where for the second inequality we use that P was the cheapest path at the beginning of the
game. By using 1. and 2., we conclude that c(P, x) > W (G) ≥ c(Bi, x) ≥ c(P, x), which is
a contradiction.
4 Extensions
We present our results for cost-sharing games and consensus games.
4.1 Cost-sharing games
A cost-sharing game is a congestion game, where the delay functions are non-increasing.
We first argue that subgame-perfect outcomes are not guaranteed to be stable, even for
symmetric singleton cost-sharing games.
example 21. Consider a cost-sharing game with two resources r, s with identical delay func-
tions dr(x) = ds(x) = d(x) such that d(x) = 2 for x = 1 and d(x) = 1 for x > 1. If three
players play this game, the subgame-perfect outcomes (r, s, s) and (s, r, r) (which can be
created by defining S3(x, y) = y and S2(x) 6= x) are unstable.
On the other hand, the above instability can be resolved for either symmetric or singleton
cost-sharing games if no ties exist.
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Theorem 22. Let G be a generic, symmetric cost-sharing game. Each k-lookahead out-
come is a Nash equilibrium of the form (Pk, . . . , Pk) for Pk = argminA∈A
∑
r∈A dr(k). In
particular, each subgame-perfect outcome is optimal.
The proof of Theorem 22 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 23. Let A be an outcome so that for any B with Bi 6= Ai for some i ∈ N , we have
ci(A) > ci(B). Then A is the unique subgame-perfect outcome.
Proof of Theorem 22. We first show that each subgame-perfect outcome is of the form
(Pn, . . . , Pn), which is the optimal profile. Because the game is generic, no other action
Q 6= Pn can cost the same as Pn does in the profile (Pn, . . . , Pn). Hence for any outcome
in which some player i plays a different action than Pn, this player is strictly worse off than
in (Pn, . . . , Pn). As a consequence, (Pn, . . . , Pn) is the only subgame-perfect outcome by
Lemma 23.
Let k ≤ n be given. The game Gk has a Pk as its unique optimal outcome. Since G
k is
again a generic, symmetric cost-sharing game, each subgame-perfect outcome is of the form
(Pk, . . . , Pk). Thus, any k-lookahead outcome has the action Pk as its first action. Let G
′
be the subgame induced by (Pk), then G
′k is again a generic, symmetric cost-sharing game.
Since the delay functions are non-increasing, the profile Pk is again the optimal profile.
Hence the second player also picks Pk. The proof now follows by continuing inductively.
We turn to inefficiency of k-lookahead outcomes. In general, the k-LPoA can increase
with k for generic, symmetric singleton cost-sharing games:
example 24. Define delay functions dr(x) =
n
x
and ds(1) = n+ 1 with ds(x) = 2 otherwise.
Each 1-lookahead equilibrium is optimal, whereas no k-lookahead equilibrium is optimal for
1 < k < n. This example can be extended make any subset of [n − 1] equal to the set
{k ∈ [n− 1] | k-LPoA(G) = 1}.
However, we can gain monotonicity by restricting the delay functions.
Corollary 25. For every generic, symmetric cost-sharing game G with delay functions of
the form dr(x) =
ar
x
+ br, k-LPoA(G) is non-increasing in k.
Proof. Theorem 22 shows that each k-lookahead outcome is of the form (Pk, . . . , Pk) for
Pk = argminA∈A
∑
r∈A dr(k). Let n the number of players. Denote ak =
∑
r∈Pk
ar and
bk =
∑
r∈Pk
br, so that
∑
r∈Pk
dr(ℓ) =
ak
ℓ
+ bk.
If k-LPoA(G) > (k−1)-LPoA(G), then in particular Pk 6= Pk−1. This implies
ak
k−1 + bk >
ak−1
k−1 + bk−1 and
ak
k
+ bk <
ak−1
k
+ bk−1. Subtracting the first from the second and dividing
by 1
k−1 −
1
k
> 0 shows ak > ak−1. This implies ak(
1
k
− 1
n
) > ak−1(
1
k
− 1
n
). Subtracting this
from ak
k
+ bk <
ak−1
k
+ bk−1 gives
∑
r∈Pk
dr(n) <
∑
r∈Pk−1
dr(n).
Theorem 26. If G is a generic singleton cost-sharing game, then each SPO is an NE.
However, k-lookahead equilibria are not guaranteed to be Nash equilibria for any k < n.
Proof. We mimick the proof for fair cost-sharing games [17]. Assume without loss of general-
ity that all resources in R can be chosen by some player. For r ∈ R, letNr = {i ∈ N : r ∈ Ai}
be the set of players that can choose resource r. Because the game is generic,
r∗ = argmin
r∈R
dr(|Nr|)
satisfies dr∗(|Nr∗ |) < ds(|Ns|) for all s ∈ R \ {r∗}. Hence if all successors and predecessors
of i ∈ Nr∗ choose r∗, then this is the unique best response for player i as well. This implies
all player i ∈ Nr∗ will choose r∗ independent of the order the players arrive in. Removing
these players from the game and repeating this at most n times, we find that the resource a
player picks does not depend on the order in which the players arrive. Since the last player
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in a subgame-perfect outcome is always giving a best response and each player can be seen
as the last player, it follows that this unique SPO is a Nash equilibrium.
An example of a 1-lookahead outcome which is not an NE can be created by putting
dr(x) =
1
x
, ds(x) =
4
3x , A1 = {r, s}, A2 = {s}. This example can be extended to give
unstable k-lookahead equilibria for any k < n by putting players in between that do not
interfere with the two players (e.g., by creating a third resource t and setting Ai = {t} for
i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}).
4.2 Consensus games
In a consensus games, each player is a vertex in a weighted graph Γ = (V,E,w) and can
choose between actions L and R. The cost of player i in outcome A is given by the sum
of the weights wij of all incident edges ij ∈ E for which Ai 6= Aj . The following example
shows that subgame-perfect outcomes may be unstable in general.
example 27. Consider a graph with vertex set V = {1, 2, 3} and edge set E = {{2, 3}, {3, 1}}.
Choose weights w23 > w13 > 0. For the order 1, 2, 3 on the players, there is only one
possibility to let player 3 act subgame-perfectly (since w23 > w13): S3(x, y) = y. Player 2 is
hence indifferent between his two actions. So we can define S2(x) 6= x (“always choose an
action different from player 1”). Player 1 is now indifferent as well and we can set S1 = L.
This defines a subgame-perfect equilibrium for which the corresponding SPO is unstable.
Note that the graph in this example forms a tree. Call an order σ tree respecting if
each player except the first succeeds at least one of his neighbours. Mimicking the proof of
Proposition 28, one can show that for each subgame-perfect outcome is optimal (i.e. of the
form (L, . . . , L) or (R, . . . , R)) for such orderings.
Proposition 28. Let G be a consensus game. If all players adopt a common tie-breaking
rule, then all k-lookahead outcomes are optimal.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that R is the preferred action of all players and
the order on the players is 1, . . . , n. (Otherwise, we can relabel the players and actions R
and L.)
We first show that each SPO A is of the form (R, . . . , R). Let S be the subgame-
perfect equilibrium corresponding to A. We show inductively that Si(R, . . . , R) = R for
all i ∈ {n, . . . , 1}, so that A = (R, . . . , R) follows. The claim for player n follows since
cn(R, . . . , R) is the optimal possible cost for player n and player n plays R when indifferent.
Assuming Si(R, . . . , R) = R holds for players n, . . . , k for some k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, player k − 1
will get cost ck−1(R, . . . , R) if he plays R, which again implies that he must choose R.
Let A be a k-lookahead outcome for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The only subgame-perfect
outcome corresponding to the order 1, . . . , k and common tie-breaking towards R is given by
(R, . . . , R), so that A1 = R. After players 1 up to ℓ have fixed action R, the profile (R, . . . , R)
increases in value at least as much as any other profile, so that (R, . . . , R) = Rmin{k,n−ℓ} will
be the only subgame-perfect outcome in the subgame induced by (A1, . . . , Aℓ) = (R, . . . , R)
for any ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. Hence A = (R, . . . , R). (We find A = (L, . . . , L) if ties are broken
in favor of L.)
5 Future work
While the focus in this paper is on congestion games, our notion of k-lookahead outcomes
naturally extends to arbitrary normal-form games (details will be given in the full version
of the paper). It will be interesting to study k-lookahead outcomes for other classes of
games. Also, an interesting direction is to consider heterogeneous (e.g., player-dependent)
anticipation levels. In particular, it would be interesting to further explore the relation
between ties and anticipation within this framework.
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Another interesting question for future research is to investigate more closely the rela-
tionship between greedy best-response and subgame-perfect outcomes. Note that in Section
3 we were able to use results for k = 1 and k = n to infer results for other values of k. This
might be true for other games as well. Especially, it would be interesting to identify general
properties of games for which such an approach goes through.
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A Subgame-perfect outcomes
We formally define subgame-perfect outcomes and Sequential Price of Anarchy for congestion
games. All definitions in this section extend easily to general normal-form games.
When going through the definitions of sequential-move version and subgame-perfect equi-
librium, it might be useful to compare them with the example in the introduction. For any
congestion game and order on the players, we can draw a game tree. This is formalised
below.
Definition 29. Let G be an n-player congestion game. Let σ : N → [n] be an order on
the players (i.e. a bijection). The sequential-move version Gσ of G is the extensive-form
game in which each player i ∈ N chooses his action after observing the actions played by
all players j ∈ N before him (those for which σ(j) < σ(i)). We represent the game by a
directed tree. Each non-leaf node is a decision state and corresponds to a player and a set
of outgoing arcs. Each leaf is an end state and corresponds to a cost vector.
• The root node is the only state of the first player σ−1(1).
• For any player i ∈ N there are |Ai| outgoing arcs from any of his states, each of which
indexed by an action Ai ∈ Ai. If σ(i) 6= n, then the head of an action Ai ∈ Ai is a
state of his successor σ−1(σ(i) + 1). If σ(i) = n then each Ai points to a leaf node.
• Each leaf node has a cost vector (ci(A))i∈N for A the profile on the path from the root
to the leaf. (This gives an action profile because the unique path from the leaf to the
root contains exactly one action from each player.)
This defines the game tree. The set of players of Gσ is N again. A strategy Si of a player
i ∈ N in Gσ is a function
Si :
∏
j∈N :σ(j)<σ(i)
Aj → Ai
that maps any state of player i to a single outgoing arc.
Given strategies Si for i ∈ N in a sequential-move version Gσ of a game G, we refer to
S = (Si)i∈N as a strategy profile. We correspond the following action profile A in G to this.
Let Aσ−1(1) := Sσ−1(1). Having defined Aσ−1(1), . . . , Aσ−1(k) for 1 ≤ k < n, we let
Aσ−1(k+1) = Sσ−1(k+1)(Aσ−1(1), . . . , Aσ−1(k)).
That is, we color the arcs that are prescribed by the strategies (similar to figure in the
introduction) and follow the unique path from the root to a leaf. Let A(S) be the action
profile corresponding to S in this way.
Write S−i = (Sj)j∈N\{i}. The strategy Si is a best response to S−i if ci(A(S)) ≤ ci(A(T ))
for all strategy profiles T with T−i = S−i. A strategy profile S is a Nash equilibrium if Si is
a best response to S−i for all i ∈ N .
Note that a Nash equilibrium S of a sequential-move version is incomparable to a Nash
equilibrium B of the original game. However, we can compare A(S) and B and we will do
this with an even stronger requirement on S.
We first need to define a subgame, which corresponds to fixing the actions of a subset of
the players and looking at the game the remaining players are left with.
Definition 30. Let G = (N , R, (Ai)i∈N , (dr)r∈R) be a congestion game. Let N ′ ⊆ N and
Bj ∈ Aj for i ∈ N ′. The subgame induced by the action profile (Bj)j∈N ′ is the congestion
game
G′ = (N \ N ′, R, (Ai)i∈N\N ′ , (d
′
r)r∈R),
where
d′r : N→ R : y 7→ dr(y + |{i ∈ N
′ : r ∈ Bi}|).
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Suppose that in the definition above the players in N ′ act first in our order, that is, let
σ : N → N a bijection so that σ−1{1, . . . , |N ′|} = N ′. We call the sequential-move version
G′σ of G′ a subgame of Gσ. The game tree of G′σ is a subtree of the game tree of Gσ,
namely the one with as root the decision node of player σ−1(|N ′|+ 1) in which he needs to
specify his action after observing (Bi)i∈N ′ . All such “subtrees” give subgames of G
σ.
Definition 31. A subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) is a strategy profile (Si)i∈N that
induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame of a given sequential-move version.
The proposition below is implicit in the work of Zermelo [21] and often seen as one of
the first results in game theory.
Proposition 32. Every sequential-move version has a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Let Gσ be a given sequential-move version and relabel the players so that σ is the
identity. We can explicitly find a subgame-perfect equilibrium by performing backward
induction. We first find the equilibria in the lowest subgames: we specify an action for the
last player given any combination of actions of the other players. The resulting costs are
known, so we can (and need to) specify one which minimises his cost. This defines Sn. (We
have drawn in a unique arc from each decision node on layer n to the leaves on layer n+1.)
Given A ∈
∏n−2
i=1 Ai and Sn, we can now pick a best response Sn−1(A) for player n − 1
to Sn in the subgame induced by A. This defines Sn−1. (We draw in the next layer by
minimising the cost of player n− 1.) Continuing this way, we get a strategy profile which is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
There might be multiple choices for best responses at each stage; for generic games there
is always a unique best response and in that case there is also a unique SPE.
A subgame-perfect equilibrium S is a strategy profile, hence there is an action profile
A(S) of G that corresponds to this: the outcome on the equilibrium path of S.
Definition 33. Let G be a congestion game and σ an order of the players. An action profile
A in G is called a subgame-perfect outcome (SPO) of G (corresponding to σ) if A is the
outcome on the equilibrium path of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Gσ.
We denote the set of subgame-perfect outcomes of a game by SPO. We will usually leave
the order on the players implicit. A statement such as “in symmetric singleton congestion
games, each SPO is an NE”, should be read as “for every symmetric singleton congestion
game G, for every order on the players σ, every subgame-perfect outcome in G corresponding
to σ is stable”.
Paes Leme et al. [17] introduce the Sequential Price of Anarchy of a game G as
SPoA(G) = max
A∈SPO(G)
max
B∈
∏
i∈N
Ai
∑
i∈N ci(A)∑
i∈N ci(B)
where SPO(G) is the set of subgame-perfect outcomes of G.
19
B Missing proofs of Section 3
Full proof of Theorem 8. Let A be an NE of G. We want to find a close generic game
G′ of which A is also an NE, and hence a subgame-perfect outcome of G′.
The game G′ has the same set of players, resources and actions as G, but its delay
functions d′r are possibly different. We say G
′ is close to G if for all paths P 6= Q and
congestion vectors (xr) and (yr)
c(P, x) :=
∑
r∈P
dr(xr) < c(Q, y) =⇒ c
′(P, x) :=
∑
r∈P
d′r(xr) ≤ c
′(Q, y).
We first show that we can find a close generic game G′ which also has A as equilibrium.
Note that we can increase the cost of individual paths without effecting the other path costs,
since each path contains a resource he shares with no other path, as shown by Milchtaic
[15]. We need to ensure that for any P 6= Q and congestion vectors x, y, c′(P, x) 6= c′(Q, y).
Starting off with the game G (a close game with A as NE), we iteratively update the delay
functions to make it generic (c(P, x) 6= c(Q, y) for P 6= Q) while not violating the two
conditions we already satisfy. The closedness condition can be ignored by always increasing
or decreasing the cost c(P, x) by an amount less than δ := min{|c(P, x)− c(Q, y)| : c(P, x) 6=
c(Q, y), Q path, y possible congestion vector} > 0. (The set is finite, so we can take the
minimum.) If P ∈ A, x = x(A) and y is the congestion vector when one person choosing P
in A switches to Q, then the fact that A is a Nash equilibrium means that c(P, x) ≤ c(Q, y).
In order to keep the Nash equilibrium condition, if we encounter an equality of such form
we simply choose to increase the cost of Q. (Since y 6= x, increasing c(Q, y) never hurts the
NE property of A.) Following these rules, we increase the delays of the resources unique to
a path, until c(P, x) 6= c(Q, y) for P 6= Q. This defines a close generic game G′ that has
A as NE. By the previous results, A is a subgame-perfect outcome of G′ corresponding to
some order σ.
Let S be the corresponding SPE. This is also a strategy profile in the sequential-move
version Gσ. It remains to show it is subgame-perfect in Gσ. By relabelling the players, we
may assume σ = Id[n]. Let A1, . . . , Aℓ ∈ A be given. We need to proveQ = Sℓ+1(A1, . . . , Aℓ)
is at least as good for player ℓ+ 1 as any other P ∈ A (given that his successors follow S).
Let x be the congestion vector of the outcome when he plays P and y for when he plays Q.
If P 6= Q, then c′(Q, y) < c′(P, x) since G′ is generic and P is subgame-perfect according to
S. By the contraposition of the closedness property, we find c(Q, y) ≤ c(P, x). This shows
S is an SPE of Gσ as well, so that A is an SPO of G.
Induced games. If we want to do induction on the graph structure for an n-player SNCG
G on SP-graph Γ, then we need to define induced games on the components of Γ.
If Γ consists of two SP-graphs Γ1 and Γ2 in series, then G induces an SNCG Gi on Γi
for i = 1, 2. Game Gi is played on graph Γi, which defines the set of resources and the
common action space, and Gi inherits the delay functions and the set of players from G.
For an action profile A of G and i = 1, 2, we denote
πi(A) = (Aj ∩ E(Γi) : j ∈ N )
where Aj ∩E(Γi) denotes the pathsegment of Aj that is contained in Γi.
If Γ consists of SP-graphs Γ1 and Γ2 in parallel, then G induces games on Γ1 and Γ2 if
we specify which players play in either game. The games inherit the delay functions from
G again and the set of resources and common action set from the graph. If A is an action
profile in G, then we let
πi(A) = (Aj : j ∈ N , Aj ⊆ Γi) (i = 1, 2).
The game Gi induced by A on Γi is the game induced by G with |πi(A)| players, namely
the players {j ∈ N : Aj ⊆ Γi}.
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When graphs are composed in series, OA(G) = Oπ1(A)(G1) +Oπ2(A)(G2). For graphs in
parallel,WA(G) = max{Wπ1(A)(G1),Wπ2(A)(G2)} andOA(G) = min{Oπ1(A)(G1), Oπ2(A)(G2).
Proof of Lemma 14. We use the following result of [8, Lemma 1] in the proof.
Lemma 34. Let G be a symmetric congestion game with n players. Let A be an action
profile and k a player so that A−k is a Nash equilibrium (in G
n−1). Then k pays WA(G).
We prove for all series-parallel graphs Γ that for any SNCG G on Γ with m ≥ n players,
action profile A of Gn and 1-lookahead outcome B of G, we have
OA(G
n) ≤ OB(G) and if m > n then also OA(G
n) ≤WB(G),
by induction on the structure of Γ. Note that by relabelling the players, we can assume
without loss of generality that B is a 1-lookahead outcome with respect to the identity. If
Γ is a single resource, then the statement holds. Suppose Γ consists of two SP-graphs Γ1
and Γ2 in series for which the statement has already been shown. Since πi(B) is also a
1-lookahead outcome in Γi for i = 1, 2, we find by induction that
OA(G
n) = Oπ1(A)(G
n
1 ) +Oπ2(A)(G
n
2 ) ≤ Oπ1(B)(G1) +Oπ2(B)(G2) = OB(G)
where Gi is the SNCG induced on Γi for i = 1, 2. This proves the first statement. Suppose
now n < m. Note that B′ = (B1, . . . , Bm−1) is a 1-lookahead outcome in G
m−1 with
m − 1 ≥ n, so we can apply the first statement with m′ = m − 1 and Lemma 34 to find
OA(G
n) ≤ OB′(G
m−1) =WB(G
m).
Suppose Γ consists of two SP-graphs Γ1 and Γ2 in parallel (for which the statement has
already been shown). For i = 1, 2, let Gℓi be the SNCG on Γi induced by G with ℓ players.
Let k = |π1(A)| the number of players choosing from Γ1 in A. We have
OA(G
n) = min{Oπ1(A)(G
k
1), Oπ2(A)(G
n−k
2 )}.
It hence suffices to upperbound either Oπ1(A)(G
k
1) or Oπ2(A)(G
n−k
2 ).
Let ℓ be the number of players that choose paths in Γ1 in B (our given 1-lookahead
outcome). If k = ℓ and n = m then we are done by induction. If this is not the case, then
either k < ℓ or n − k < m − ℓ, so we may assume k < ℓ by symmetry. Note that π1(B) is
also a 1-lookahead outcome in Gℓ1, the SNCG induced on Γ1, so that by induction we find
Oπ1(A)(G
k
1) ≤Wπ1(B)(G
ℓ
1) ≤WB(G) ≤ OB(G),
where the last equality is because B is an NE. This proves both statements in this case.
Proof of Proposition 16 Assume there is a profile B with x(B) = x(A) for some A ∈M.
Then Φ(A) = Φ(B) so that B ∈ M. By Corollary 15, if this profile B is a 1-lookahead
outcome, all 1-lookahead outcomes are necessarily global minima of Φ. It hence suffices to
prove that for all A ∈ M, there exists a 1-lookahead outcome B with x(A) = x(B).
We prove the statement by induction on the graph structure. For SNCG Gn with n
players on series-parallel graph Γ, let M(Gn) denote the set of global minima of the game.
When Γ consists of a single resource, then the claim holds. If Γ consists of two series-parallel
graphs in series, then Gn induces games Gn1 and G
n
2 on the components and
M(Gn) =M(Gn1 )×M(G
n
2 ).
Namely, if ΦGn is the Rosenthal potential function corresponding to G
n, then
ΦGn(A) = ΦGn
1
(π1(A)) + ΦGn
2
(π2(A)),
so that A ∈ M(Gn) if and only if πi(A) ∈ M(Gni ) for i ∈ {1, 2}. If A ∈ M(G
n), then for
i ∈ {1, 2}, πi(A) is a global minimum, hence by induction there is a 1-lookahead outcome
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Bi inducing the same flows. Permuting the players in B1 if necessary, we get a 1-lookahead
outcome (B1, B2) with the same congestion vector as A.
If Γ1 and Γ2 are placed in parallel, then G
n induces games Gk1 and G
n−k
2 on the com-
ponents for any k ∈ {0, . . . , n}. Let A ∈ M(Gn) and k = |π1(A)|. By induction, we find
that π1(A) and π2(A) are 1-lookahead outcomes and it remains to prove that we can “in-
terweave” these into a 1-lookahead outcome B. Recall that each global minimum is a Nash
equilibrium. This means that if k = 0, n, then none of the players had a better response
in the other component at any point, so that we are done with B = A. If this is not the
case, we must have that π1(A) contains a cheapest path P1 in Γ1 (at the start) and π2(A)
a cheapest path P2 in Γ2, so that either must be a cheapest path of Γ. Let B1 denote this
path. We now repeat this recursively. Remove the first occurrence of B1 from the profile A
and apply the same reasoning for the game induced by (B1): again, either all players pick
from the same component and we are done, or a cheapest path (with respect to the delay
functions of the 1-player subgame induced by (B1)) is chosen from both components.
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C Generalization of k-lookahead outcomes to arbitrary
games
We elaborate on how our notion of k-lookahead outcomes can be generalized to arbitrary
normal-form games. A (normal-form) game G is a tuple (N , (Ai)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ) consisting of
a finite set of players N = [n] and for each player i ∈ N a finite set of actions Ai and a cost
function ci : A1 × · · · × An → R. Given a normal-form game G and an order σ : N → [n]
on the players, we need a cost function for player i
c
(j)
i :
∏
ℓ∈σ−1{1,...,j}
Aℓ → R
that assigns each partial profile of actions of the players up to the jth player to a cost for
player i (for every j ∈ {k, . . . , n} and i ∈ σ−1{j−k+1, . . . , j}). For j = n, the game already
prescribes cost functions, so it is natural to set c
(n)
i = ci for all i ∈ σ
−1{n−k+1, . . . , , n}. This
is the minimal information required for defining a k-lookahead outcome of G corresponding
to order σ.
We want to refer to a k-lookahead outcome of G as a k-lookahead outcome corresponding
to some order of the players and we therefore define a k-lookahead structure so that it allows
the definition of k-looakhead outcomes for any order on the players.
Definition 35. Let G = (N , (Ai)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ) be a normal-form game. For k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
a k-lookahead structure for G is a tuple of cost functions
Ck = (c
(j)
i | j ∈ {k, . . . , n}, i ∈ N )
where for j ∈ {k, . . . , n} and i ∈ N , the jth partial cost function for player i
c
(j)
i :
⋃
i∈N⊆N
|N |=j
∏
ℓ∈N
Aℓ → R
assigns each partial profile of size j to a cost for player i. Moreover, c
(n)
i = ci for all i ∈ N .
For technical convenience, we define a k-lookahead structure for k > n to be an n-
lookahead structure. Note that a k-lookahead structure is also a (k+1)-lookahead structure.
We will also refer to a 1-lookahead structure as a lookahead structure, since this allows the
definition of k-lookahead outcomes for any k.
Each game has only one n-lookahead structure (given by the cost functions of the game).
For k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, there exist many k-lookahead structures for every game G.
example 36. Let G be a normal-form game and k < n. For any x ∈ R, we can define the
“constant x” k-lookahead structure on G: for j ∈ {k, . . . , n − 1}, i ∈ N and N a subset of
players of size j containing player i, let c
(j)
i : (Aℓ)ℓ∈N 7→ x.
Ideally, we would like a k-lookahead structure to give a “good prediction” of the cost a
player will end up getting. We can use the set of costs
S = {ci(A1, . . . , Aj , Bj+1, . . . , Bn) | Bj+1 ∈ Aj+1, . . . , Bn ∈ An}
that player i can possibly get in the future to give an intermediate cost for player i (e.g. by
setting c
(j)
i (A) := max(S)). However, the size of the set S can grow exponentially in the
number of players, so that we lose the computational advantage of not expanding the game
tree. Defining k-lookahead structures this way will therefore not be very useful in practice.
A k-lookahead structure also induces a k-lookahead structure on subgames, as shown
below. Let {c
(j)
i } be a k-lookahead structure for a game G. Let A = (Ai)i∈[m] give actions
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of players 1, . . . ,m. Then the subgame G′ = (N ′, (Ai)i∈N ′ , (c′i)i∈N ′) induced by A has
player set N ′ = {m+ 1, . . . , n} with cost functions defined by c′i(B) = ci(A,B) for i ∈ N
′.
We can define a k-lookahead structure on G′ by setting
c′
(j)
i :
⋃
i∈N⊆N ′
|N |=j
∏
ℓ∈N
Aℓ → R : B 7→ c
(j)
i (A,B)
for j ∈ {k, . . . , n − m} and i ∈ N ′. For a game G = (N , (Ai)i, (ci)i) with k-lookahead
structure Ck = (c
(j)
i )i,j for k ≤ n and any given order of the players σ, we can define a
normal-form game
Gk = Gk(σ, Ck) := (N
′, (Ai)i∈N ′ , (c
(k)
i )i∈N ′)
by setting N ′ = σ−1{1, . . . , k}, the first k players. If k > n, then we define Gk := Gn. The
definition of k-lookahead structure is chosen in such a way that (G′)k is defined for each
subgame G′.
Definition 37. Let G be an n-player game and Ck a k-lookahead structure for k ≤ n. An
action profile A is a k-lookahead outcome of G (with respect to Ck) if there exists an
order σ on the players so that for each i ∈ N we have that Ai equals the action Bi played by
player i in some subgame-perfect outcome B of (G′)k(σ, Ck) that corresponds to the order
σ, where G′ is the subgame of G induced by (Aj)σ(j)<σ(i).
Hence, in a k-lookahead outcome player 1 chooses an action which is found by performing
k levels of backward induction while using the k-lookahead structure to assign costs to
the nodes on level k + 1. Player 2 performs min{k, n − 1} levels of backward induction
in the subtree with as root the node reached by following the arc corresponding to the
action of player 1 (using the k-lookahead structure to assign costs to the nodes on level
min{k + 2, n+ 1}).
The definition of k-LPoA and the relation between n-lookahead outcomes and subgame-
perfect outcomes generalise when we call a game generic if ci(A) 6= ci(B) for all profiles A,B
with Ai 6= Bi. The definition we gave for congestion games corresponds to the one above if
the lookahead structure “current costs” is used: for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and N ⊆ N a set of size
j, we set
c
(j)
i (A) =
∑
r∈Ai
dr(x(A)r) where x(A)r = |{ℓ ∈ N : r ∈ Aℓ}|,
for i ∈ N and A ∈
∏
i∈N Ai.
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